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UNCONSTITUTIONAL TREATIES
By Wm. W. BIsHoP, J'R.*
I. THE PROBLEM
In recent years there has been much discussion over the relation
of treaties to the United States Constitution, and much debate as to
whether various proposed Constitutional amendments might be de-
sirable. Up to the present time, no treaty made by the United States
has ever been held unconstitutional, the record of the treaty-making
organs in this respect being considerably better than that of Con-
gress in legislating; but it is at least conceivable that on some future
occasion a treaty might not conform with our Constittition. Such a
situation has not been unknown in some other countries, and has at
times involved treaties made by those countries with the United
States. Under such circumstances, would a treaty bind a nation
internationally, though found not to be in conformity with its
constitution ?
There seems little doubt that domestic courts, both here and
abroad, would hold an unconstitutional treaty void and ineffective
as national or "internal" law. A few foreign constitutions so pro-
claim. As a matter of American constitutional law, and when viewed
by American federal or state authorities, it seems clear that treaties
are on a par with with federal statutes in this respect, and that both
would be held invalid when unconstitutional, under the principles
laid down by the Supreme Court in Marbury v. Madison, and many
cases since. The Supreme Court has repeatedly said that this would
be the case with an unconstitutional treaty:
It need hardly be said that a treaty cannot change the Constitu-
tion or be held valid if it be in violation of that instrument.2
*Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
1. 5 U.S. (1 Cr.) 137 (1803).
2. The Cherokee Tobacco, 78 U.S. (11 Wa!.) 616, 620-21 (1870). See
also Doe v. Braden, 57 U.S. (16 How.) 635, 656 (1853) ; Downes v. Bidwell,
182 U.S. 244, 370 (1901) ; In Geofroy v. Riggs, 133 U.S. 258, 267 (1890), Mr.
Justice Field amplified this statement, saying:
The treaty power, as expressed in the Constitution, is in terms unlimited
except by those restraints which are found in that instrument against the
action of the government or of its departments, and those arising from
the nature of the government itself and of that of the States. It would not
be contended that it extends so far as to authorize what the Constitution
forbids, or a change in the character of the government or in that of one
of the States, or a cession of any portion of the territory of the latter,
without its consent.
In 1854 Secretary of State Marcy wrote:
The Constitution is to prevail over a treaty where the provisions of the
one come in conflict with the other. It would be difficult to find a reputable
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What do we mean by treaties which do not conform to national
constitutions? Constitutions, whether written or found largely in
practice and convention, usually specify the organs by whose action
the state enters into treaty obligations, and may specifically or by
inference prohibit the making of certain types of treaties. Under
most contemporary constitutions, international agreements are con-
cluded by the chief executive (or on his responsibility), but must
receive the approval of a legislative body such as our Senate or a
Parliament. Although this process of approval by a legislative organ
is popularly called "ratification," in precise legal terminology rati-
fication is an executive act by which the provisions of the treaty are
formally confirmed and approved by the state. The Senate of the
United States does not "ratify," but advises and consents to the
ratification by the President.3 Many of the disputes over the effect
of unconstitutional treaties have arisen from disregard of constitu-
tional provisions requiring legislative approval. Added complica-
tions occur when the state may enter into some types of international
agreements by one procedure but must use a more formal or difficult
process for other kinds. 4
In concrete terms, what international obligations, if any, would
the United States have undertaken if President Wilson in 1919
had deposited an instrument of ratification, in proper form, of the
Treaty of Versailles without obtaining the advice and consent of the
Senate? Would it have made any difference in such case if, in the
instrument of ratification or in a public statement, the President had
formally announced either that no action by the Senate was neces-
sary, or that approval of the Senate had been obtained although
in fact the Senate had not taken favorable action? Or suppose a
President, having failed to get the requisite two-thirds vote in the
Senate, submits the same agreement to both Houses of Congress for
lawyer in this country who would not yield a ready assent to this propo-
sition. 5 Moore, Digest of International Law, 167 (1906).
Though in debates over the proposed Bricker Amendment some have
urged the necessity of amending the Constitution to make it say plainly that
treaties must not be in conflict with the Constitution, such an amendment seems
entirely unnecessary in view of the constant attitude of the courts and the
executive branch of the Government, that this is already the law. After all,
the United States Constitution is no more specific in stating the invalidity of
unconstitutional acts of Congress than it is with respect to unconstitutional
treaties !
3. See 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 48 (1943) ; J. Jones,
Full Powers and Ratification 136 (1946).
4. Cf. our American practice under which we make "treaties," in the
narrow sense of the word, by President and Senate, acting by two-thirds vote;
but make"Presidential" executive agreements by the executive alone, and
"Congressional" executive agreements by authority of the President plus
both Houses of Congress acting by mere majority vote.
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approval as a "Congressional" agreement, and then after both
Houses approve by a bare majority and the President notifies the
other party, the Supreme Court declares this a "treaty" which could
only be made by the method of Senate approval by a two-thirds
vote? In similar fashion, the Swedish Constitution authorizes the
King to make treaties after consultation with the Council of State,
but requires that treaties "of major importance" be approved by
the Riksdag (Parliament). What would happen if the King deems
the treaty not one "of major importance," but after exchange of
ratifications it is authoritatively held that as a matter of Swedish
constitutional law approval of the Riksdag was required?
Some constitutions specify that no treaties of a certain kind may
be made, such as the Costa Rican Constitution, which in Article 7
declares that,
No authority may conclude pacts, treaties, or conventions which
are in conflict with the sovereignty or independence of the Re-
public.
What happens if the President and Legislative Assembly believe
that a treaty for some type of Central American unification does not
contravene this provision, but the treaty is afterwards held uncon-
stitutional as repugnant to Article 7 ?'
Other constitutions, like that of the United States, do not so
explicitly forbid the making of treaties, but it seems clear that the
Supreme Court would, for example, hold invalid a treaty violating
rights guaranteed by our Constitution. What would happen inter-
nationally if the Supreme Court should strike down as unconstitu-
tional a hypothetical treaty with State X providing for trial by a
three-judge federal court without jury of all persons accused of
plotting in the United States a revolution against the Government
of X, in violation of our laws against steps to overthrow friendly
foreign governments? Or what if the Supreme Court should hold
unconstitutional, as in violation of the sixth amendment right of
accused persons "to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses
in his favor," the application of a treaty exempting foreign consular
5. Similar problems arise under the Mexican Constitution, where
Articles 76 and 89 provide that treaties are concluded by the President with
approval of the Senate, but Article 15 specifies that no treaties shall be con-
cluded for the extradition of "political criminals," nor treaties which alter the
individual guarantees and rights established in the Constitution. It is easy to
envisage difficulty as to whether a particular crime is "political," when the
Mexican Constitution is silent on the many controversies which have occurred
elsewhere over the scope of "political crimes," or as to whether a treaty




officers from compulsory process to give testimony on behalf of
defendants in an American criminal proceeding?
There seems no need to multiply such conceivable examples, but
one may well ask whether it makes any differences in each of the
foregoing cases if we are dealing with an unwritten consitution
rather than a written one, and whether the ease or difficulty of a
foreign treaty negotiator obtaining authentic information about the
constitution is relevant.
II. SUGGESTED SOLUTIONS
This problem has been discussed by many writers, and a number
of possible solutions have been suggested." Some stress the impor-
tance of upholding constitutional provisions, and, like Professor
C. C. Hyde in the first edition of his treatise, would say that "an
unconstitutional treaty must be regarded as void."7 Others would
6. As perhaps representative of the wide literature on this topic, particu-
larly in Europe, one might mention, inter alia: Chailly, La nature juridique
des trait~s selon le droit contemporain 167 (1932) ; McNair, Constitutional
Limitations upon the Treaty-Making Power, in Arnold, Treaty-Making Pro-
cedure 1-15 (1933) ; Fitzmaurice, Do Treaties Need Ratification?, 1934 Brit.
Yearbook Int'l Law 113; Harvard Research in International Law, Treaties,
29 Am. J. Int'l L. 992-1009 (Supp. 1935) ; Fairman, Competence to Bind the
State to an International Engagement, 30 Am. J. Int'l L. 439 (1936) ; McNair,
Law of Treaties 38-46 (1938) ; Vitta, La validitj des traitis internationauz,
14 Bibliotheca Visseriana 32-97 (1940) ; de Visscher, De la conclusion des
trait~s internationaux (1943) ; J. Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 134-57
(1946), this chapter being largely a republication of Constitutional Limitations
on the Treaty-Making Power, 35 Am. J. Int'l L. 462 (1941); Hendry,
Treaties and Federal Constitutions 137-62 (1955); University of Michigan
Law School, Eighth Summer Institute (1955), International Law and the
United Nations 194-211 (1957).
The Harvard Research, and the studies by Vitta and de Visscher, supra,
contain extensive bibliographies on this topic, as does also I Oppenheim's
International Law § 497 (8th ed., Lauterpacht 1955).
7. 2 Hyde, International Law, Chiefly as Interpreted and Applied by the
United States 9 (1922). de Visscher, op. cit. supra note 6, concludes that con-
stitutional restrictions have full international effect. Wayne Williams suc-
cinctly gives the reason why many advocate this view, saying:
The central difficulty with the argument for validity is that instances of
international usage, accepted as law, are too fragmentary and inconclusive
to be of much value.
He adds:
[L] et us fully sense the vital importance of maintaining the integrity and
sanctity of national constitutions, written and unwritten. This, after
all, is the cornerstone-principle of sovereignty in the people, and of repre-
sentative government. (Michigan Summer Institute, mpra note 6, at
200-01).
Professor Hyde's second edition (1945) changed from this view, to read:
[I]t may be said that where a contracting State holds out to another
assurance that the terms of a proposed agreement are not violative of the
fundamental laws of the former, and does so through an agent who is
supposedly conversant with the requirements thereof by reason of the
character of his connection with the particular department of his govern-
ment to which is confided the management of foreign affairs, and when
[Vol. 42:773
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follow the somewhat similar view of the Harvard Research in Inter-
national Law, which under the leadership of Professors Manley
Hudson and J. W. Garner concluded in 1935 that,
A state is not bound by a treaty made on its behalf by an organ
or authority not competent under its law to conclude the treaty;
however, a state may be responsible for an injury resulting to
another state from reasonable reliance by the latter upon a repre-
sentation that such organ or authority was competent to conclude
the treaty. 8
In an intermediate position we find Professor A. D. McNair
(now Lord McNair) writing:
It seems more reasonable.., to say that in concluding a treaty
if one party produces an instrument 'complete and regular on
the face of it' (to borrow an expression from another department
of law) though in fact constitutionally defective, the other party,
if it is ignorant and reasonably ignorant of the defect, is entitled
to assume that the instrument is in order and to hold the former
to the obligations of the treaty.'
no written constitution is involved, and no published and authoritative
instrument notoriously proclaims an opposing view, there is ground for
the conclusion that the contracting State holding out such assurance is
not in a position to deny the validity of the agreement -vhich has been con-
cluded in pursuance thereof. (2 Hyde, op. cit. supra at 1385).
8. 29 Am. J. Int'l L. 992 (Supp. 1935).
In I Oppenheim's International Law § 497 (8th ed. 1955), Prof. Lauter-
pacht expresses somewhat similar views. He qualifies his statement that un-
constitutional treaties do not bind the state by adding:
That principle must not, however, be allowed to operate so as to enable
Governments to conduct themselves in a manner prejudicial to the
sanctity of treaties and obligations of good faith. For these reasons,
although a treaty is voidable, at the option of the State concerned, if it
has been entered into in disregard of the limitations of its constitutional
laws and practice, that State must be deemed to have waived its right
to assert the invalidity of the treaty if for a prolonged period it has failed
to do so, or if it has acted upon it, or has obtained advantage from it.
Moreover, in cases in which a treaty must be held invalid on account of
disregard of constitutional limitations of a contracting party, principle de-
mands that that party must be responsible for any damage to the other
contracting party in cases in which the latter cannot properly be ex-
pected to have had knowledge of the constitutional limitations in
question.
9. McNair, Constitutional Limitations upon the Treaty-Making Power,
in Arnold, Treaty-Making Procedure 6 (1933). This is not far from the
view expressed by Prof. Hyde in his second edition, op. cit. supra note 7.
Likewise, Jules Basdevant had said that if the treaty were ratified "in manifest
violation of the constitution" it should not be treated as internationally valid.
La Conclusion et la rdaction des traitis et des instriments diploinatiques autres
que les traitis, 15 Acadgmie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours 535,
581 (1926-V).
A variant on this idea is the conclusion by G. Balladore Pallieri, that the
question depends on the "principle of good faith," according to which "the
treaty is effective in the international sphere when a state can believe in good
faith that the organ with which it has dealt was competent.' He regards this
1958]
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
Some would say that treaties are internationally invalid if they do
not conform 'to constitutional provisions described variously as
"procedural," or "directly concerned with treaty-making," but are
valid when they conflict with constitutional provisions described as
"remote" or "substantive," or as concerned with the execution or
performance of the treaty. In this group we might place J. M. Jones,
who concludes after a careful study emphasizing procedures and
particularly full powers as evidence of authority, that:
From the evidence of American and South American practice we
are entirely justified in saying that upon the American and South
American continents constitutional limitations are deemed to be
fully operative in international law. A treaty which is constitu-
tionally invalid is internationally null and void....
With regard to States outside the American and South American
continents the evidence tends in the same direction, but is not of
such a character that it can be confidently regarded as conclusive.
Restrictions relating to procedure bear on the formal validity of
the treaty and must be complied with. Those relating to the con-
tent of the treaty are internationally ineffective .... A State may
lawfully organize and distribute power as it wishes. The com-
petent authority to make treaties is determined by its law, since
it is for it to prescribe through what organs, and by what pro-
cedure, it shall make treaties. But a treaty perfect in point of
form cannot be declared null or be affected by reason of a conflict
between its provisions and the laws of one of the parties.10
Yet other international lawyers would go as far as G. G. Fitz-
maurice (now Sir Gerald) of the British Foreign Offices, who wrote
in 1934:
[It] is submitted that the only rule which is both logical and
readily applicable from the practical point of view is to the effect
that states have no concern whatsoever with, and cannot as a
general proposition be held to have any knowledge of each other's
laws or constitutions; that a state which purports to become
regularly bounded by an international agreement, by giving its
international ratification thereto, or otherwise, must be presumed
to have complied with all necessary internal constitutional re-
quirements, and that other states are entitled to assume that
this is so. If it afterwards turns out that such requirements have
not in fact been complied with, the state must nevertheless be
regarded as being internationally bound and cannot plead the
failure in question as absolving it from its obligation: any state
as close to Basdevant's position, "for the fact that a constitutional provision is
notorious is often a decisive element to exclude any possibility of good faith
on the part of the other contracting party in the cases where it [such provi-
sion] has been violated." La Formation des traitis dans la pratique interna-
tionale contemporaine, 74 Acad6mie de Droit International, Recueil des Cours
465, 483-86 (1949-I).
10. J. Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 149-52 (1946).
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state whose executive has placed it in this position must seek
its remedy by proceeding internally against the executive in
question or its individual members, and externally by denounc-
ing the treaty at the earliest possible moment: but it cannot plead
that the treaty is void ab initio."
Some support this position on the ground that national law, in-
cluding constitutions, and international law operate in separate and
distinct spheres, with international law superior in the "international
forum."' 2 Others refer to the great difficulty or impossibility of one
government's getting authentic information about the constitution of
another except through the latter's own executive.13 Others em-
phasize the need for States to be able to rely on each other's usual
organs of doing international business if there is to be any stability
of international relations and mutual respect among nations.'- And
yet others point to the increasing importance of being able to rely on
11. Fitzmaurice, op. cit. supra note 6, at 136.
Similarly, W. W. Willoughby wrote:
Peculiarities of constitutional structure of one State are without inter-
national significance to other States. Each State, as a member of the inter-
national society of States, has an organ of government through which
it communicates with and enters into contractual and other relations
with other States. Whatever undertakings are entered into by such organs
are internationally binding upon the States which they represent
(Fundamental Concepts of Public Law 315 (1924).)
In his Treaties and Federal Constitutions (1955), Prof. James Hendry
finds that violations of constitutional requirements, of whatever kind and
whether or not "notorious" or "dear," do not affect the international validity
of agreements entered into by Heads of States or organs having patent or
apparent authority to act for and bind the state in foreign affairs.
In the Michigan Summer Institute, supra note 6, at 205, Prof. John
Dalzell likewise suggested that the real question was whether there was
"apparent authority, based upon conduct and communications for which the
state is responsible, to make the agreement in question." If there was reason-
able ground to believe that the representative acting for the state had authority,
that should suffice to obligate the state.
12. See, e.g., Anzilotti, Corso di Diritto Internazionale 306-10 (4th ed.
as published in Opere di Dionisio Anzilotti, 1955).
13. See, e.g., Quincy Wright's endorsement of Fitzmaurice's views, to
which he added: "The only avenue for a foreign state to get authoritative
information about the Constitution of the United States is through the Presi-
dent, and if the President says that under the Ccnstitution the United States
is capable of making this kind of treaty, I think a foreign government is bound
to accept that statement and that in international law the treaty is valid."
Michigan Summer Institute, supra note 6, at 198-99.
14. Referring to the reasons back of recent support for the view that
treaties may be internationally valid though unconstitutional, Prof. Jay
Murphy said, Michigan Summer Institute, supra note 6, at 202:
Another factor possibly contributing to change in some views is that the
United Nations has both intensified relations among nations and furthered
the habit of representation by agents with responsibility to act. Perhaps
the growth of administrative agencies among modem nations will give
force to this habit . . .it would appear increasingly important that na-
tions be able to rely upon each other's agents since damages and compen-
sation are generally inadequate remedies.
1958]
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another nation's agents as compared with the relatively slight risk
to the other nation in following this rule.15
On two relatively minor points there seems to be less doubt and
confusion. Most would agree that from the international standpoint
a treaty which was valid and properly constitutional when made is
not thereafter invalidated by any subsequent change in the con-
stitution of a party. 6 There also seems little doubt about the effect
of a practice, frequently followed in recent years, of specifying in a
treaty that it "shall be ratified by the signatory states in accordance
with their respective constitutional processes,'1 7 or similar wording.
In such a case the treaty itself has conditioned its international obli-
gatory force upon compliance with the constitution. With such an
article in the treaty, failure to comply with a State's constitution
would invalidate the treaty as to that State.18
The foregoing represent the widely differing conclusions on this
problem drawn by various writers. How far can we say any one of
the rules or principles is really the international law rule? In asking
this, we are in effect trying to predict the answer which would be
given by an impartial international court having jurisdiction over
the case. Such a court, charged with the application of international
law, would find that law in relevant treaties, international customary
law, and perhaps in any pertinent "general principles of law recog-
nized by civilized nations"; and would be aided by the views of
writers and previous judicial decisions.19 There is no general treaty
in force laying down a rule of law on this question, so we must turn
to international custom, or "general practice accepted as law," find-
ing this both as expressed in the few relevant international judicial
and arbitral decisions, and in the practice of nations in instances
which have not come before any courts.
III. INTERNATIONAL DECISIONS
The earliest international decision treating this topic appears to
be President Cleveland's award of March 22, 1888, in the boundary
15. Hendry, op. cit. supra note 6, urges that other international legal
rules and practices regarding treaties afford sufficient protection. Among
those mentioned are the normal requirements of ratification to permit "sober,
second thought!' before the state is bound, the inclusion of appropriate lan-
guage in the treaty to ensure constitutional processes or the making of reser-
vations to like effect, and the requirement of full powers or other evidence of
authority, since "if the agents act outside this authority, or with no authority,
the state is not responsible."
16. Cf. remarks by Wayne Williams and John Dalzell, Michigan Sum-
mer Institute, supra note 6, at 200, 205.
17. United Nations Charter, art. 110, para. 1.
18. Cf. J. Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 120-22 (1946).
19. On sources of international law, see Statute of International Court
of Justices, art. 38.
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dispute between Nicaragua and Costa Rica. Costa Rica relied on a
treaty signed by the two countries on April 15, 1858, which Nica-
ragua had, since 1870, claimed invalid. The treaty was signed while
a Nicaraguan Constitutional Assembly was preparing a new con-
stitution, adopted August 19, 1858. This Constitutional Assembly
had authorized the Executive to make the treaty, specifying that
approval by the legislative body was not necessary. The Nicaraguan
President exchanged ratifications of the treaty with the President
of Costa Rica on April 26, 1858, the trea-y having specified that
ratifications should be exchanged within 40 days after signature.
Thereafter, on May 28, 1858 (43 days after signature), the Nica-
raguan Constitutional Assembly approved the treaty, and no ques-
tion of validity was raised until 1870. The dispute which then ensued
was submitted by Costa Rica and Nicaragua to arbitration by Presi-
dent Cleveland of the United States, who. was asked to rule on
the validity of the treaty and its interpretation if valid.
Nicaragua claimed that the treaty was invalid because her 1838
Constitution, said to be still in force when it was concluded, laid
down Nicaragua's boundaries and could only be altered by an
amending procedure which wa not followed in making the treaty of
1858. Nicaragua also claimed that the 1838 constitution made ap-
proval by Congress a prerequisite to ratification, stating that there
had never been any approval of the treaty by Congress, and that the
approval by the Constitutional Assembly was further defective
because it took place 43 days after signature rather than within the
40-day period for exchange of ratifications. 2
President Cleveland's award interpreted the treaty after very
briefly finding that it "is valid," in which he relied on a report by
Assistant Secretary of State Rives, to whom he had delegated the
task of fuller study as authorized by the arbitration agreement.
Rives found untenable all the Nicaraguan arguments for invalidity
of the treaty. In an often cited passage, he said:
The general doctrine that in determining the validity of a treaty
made in the name of a state, the fundamental laws of such state
must furnish the guide for determination, has been fully and ably
discussed on the part of Nicaragua, and its correctness may cer-
tainly be admitted.
20. 2 Moore, History and Digest of International Arbitrations to Which
the United States Has Been a Party 1945-68 (1898).
21. Rives rejected as irrelevant the Nicaraguan contention that the treaty
was ineffective between the two parties to it, Nicaragua and Costa Rica, be-
cause it provided that they would accept the mediation of Salvador but
Salvador had not ratified the treaty.
1958]
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The effect of this statement is somewhat qualified by the next two
sentences:
But it is also certain that where a treaty has been approved by
a government, and an effort is subsequently made to avoid it for
the lack of some formalities, the burden is upon the party who
alleges invalidity to show clearly that the requirements of the
fundamental law have not been complied with. In my judgment,
Nicaragua has failed in establishing a case under this rule.
Rives doubted whether the 1838 constitution was actually in force
in 1858, and found that even if in force it did not prescribe Nica-
ragua's boundaries in such a fashion that the boundary treaty was
in conflict. He treated approval by the Constitutional Assembly as
sufficient legislative approval, and held that Nicaragua could raise
no objection because such approval came after exchange of ratifica-
tions and 43 days after signature. These irregularities of procedure
were immaterial if Costa Rica "by its acquiescence has seen fit to
waive delay."
In view of this finding that the treaty did not violate the Nica-
raguan constitution, the Rives opinion is hardly strong authority for
the proposition that unconstitutional treaties are internationally
void. Nevertheless, it does remain important for the statement that
the "correctness may be admitted" of the doctrine that a State's
constitution determines the validity of a treaty made in its name.
The next international decision to consider was that in the
dispute over the Consular Residence at Rio Martin, in Morocco.22
By a treaty of 1783 the Maghzen of Morocco had agreed with Great
Britain to build at Rio Martin a house, part of which was to be used
as a residence for the British Consul. After this house was built and
long occupied, the British Diplomatic Agent in Morocco sought to
exchange the house at Rio Martin for one in or near Tetuan. In an
exchange of notes, the Maghzen of Morocco agreed, but for one
reason or another the new residence was never provided. Spain
assumed a protectorate over that part of Morocco, and the dispute
over the new residence was submitted by Great Britain and Spain to
the famous Swiss jurist Huber, then President of the Permanent
Court of International Justice, for "examination and report." Spain
denied that as protecting power she had assumed any Moroccan
obligation in this matter, and asserted that under the Moroccan Con-
stitution in force at the time of the exchange of notes the British
proposal to substitute a residence at Tetuan could only have been
22. Annual Digest of Public International Law Cases, 1923-24, case
No. 9, Report of Dec. 29, 1924.
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accepted by Morocco in the form of a Sherifican decree and not by
a note from the Maghzen.
Reporting in favor of Great Britain, Judge Huber ruled that
Spain was liable under the Moroccan obligation. He stated that the
Moroccan failure to accept the British proposal in the form of a
Sherifican decree was not important:
The Rapporteur does not believe that he had to inquire into this
point of Moroccan constitutional law. It was enough, to estab-
lish that the aforesaid exchange of notes, which took place be-
tween the authorized agents of the two governments, established
in clear fashion the accord of their wills to transfer to a house at
Tetuan the rights which the British government had over the
house at Martin under the terms of a treaty in force.
While this was only a "report" rather than. strictly speaking, an
arbitral award, it does show a distinguished international judge
adopting in an actual case before him the position that a State may
become bound by an international agreement, whether or not the
proper constitutional forms have been followed.
The "World Court" has not passed on this question of uncon-
stitutional treaties, but in both the Free Zones case in 1932 and the
Eastern Greenland case in 1933 it dealt with closely analogous situa-
tions. The former case 23 grew out of the "free zones" established
in 1815 in favor of the commercial interests of Geneva, Switzerland,
in what became part of France. Article 435 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, to which Switzerland was not a party, recognized the
need to modify the regime of the free zones; and in 1921 Switzer-
land and France signed a convention for abolition of the free zones
in exchange for certain compensations in favor of Switzerland. How-
ever, in the referendum of 1923, required by the Swiss Constitution
for certain types of treaties, the Swiss voters rejected this conven-
tion. In 1924 the controversy between France and Switzerland over
the free zones was submitted to the Permanent Court of Interna-
tion Justice.
24
In the course of oral argument before the Court, the Swiss agent
on April 22, 1932, declared that if France would so agree, Switzer-
land would agree that the question of exchange of goods between
Switzerland and the free zones should be regulated by experts, who
would be named by the Court if the parties could not agree upon
23. P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46. On this case see also de Visscher, op. cit.
supra note 6, at 183-93.
24. Before the court France relied on Article 435 of the Treaty of Ver-
sailles, and on the alleged termination of the 1815 treaty obligation by change
of circumstances.
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them. He said Switzerland would accept this, "without reservation
of later ratification. '25 The French agent, Professor Basdevant, in
his oral statement to the court on April 26, replied that this was a
proposal for a new- agreement which should be dealt with through
diplomatic channels. He said he had no authority to negotiate or to
accept such an offer, and expressed doubts whether under Swiss
law the Swiss agent had any power to bind Switzerland in the pro-
posed manner, since under Swiss law the agreement would have
to be approved by the Federal Assembly or by popular referendum.
Therefore, he said, the Swiss agent's declaration was "unaccepta-
ble." 26 Several days later the Swiss agent reiterated that he could
entirely reassure the French on this matter of Swiss law; the ques-
tion as to approval by the Federal Assembly or referendum was an
internal matter: "Vis-a-vis France, Switzerland will be definitely
bound by the declaration which I have read in my argument.
' 27
The Court thereafter found for Switzerland by a vote of six to
five, and inter alia, ordered that the declaration by the Swiss agent
be placed on record. Referring to this declaration, the Court said:
It is true that, in the course of the recent hearings, the French
Agent declared the Swiss proposal to be unacceptable; but it is
also true that he regarded it as an offer to conclude a Special
Agreement, an offer which, in this form, he had no power to
entertain. It is also true that the French Agent expressed certain
doubts as to the binding character, from a constitutional point
of view, of the Swiss declaration; having regard to the circum-
stances in which this declaration was made, the Court must how-
ever regard it as binding on Switzerland. 28
It may be noted that, of the five dissenting judges, only the French
national judge, Dreyfus, regarded the Swiss declaration as not
offering France "any effective guarantee." After the judgment, the
French Government in 1933 accepted the Swiss agent's proposal.
It is true that this decision related to the authority of an agent
before the Court to enter into an agreement in settlement of the
litigated controversy, rather than a disregard of constitutional pro-
visions in concluding an ordinary treaty. One may argue that such
an agent has fuller and less restricted powers with respect to such
an agreement than do the normal treaty-making organs. Nonethe-
less, this case shows a judicial attitude clearly in favor of the inter-
national validity of an agreement without regard to whether the
constitution of one party is complied with. This is particularly
25. P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 58, at 448-49.
26. Id. at 563-65.
27. Id. at 616-17.
28. P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 46, at 170.
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interesting in view of the fate of the 1921 convention and the French
awareness of the apparent constitutional difficulty in Switzerland.
The Eastern Greenland case29 was brought by Denmark when in
1931 Norway issued a decree asserting sovereignty over portions of
eastern Greenland. Denmark claimed that she had previously estab-
lished territorial sovereignty over all Greenland, while Norway
argued that the part annexed by her was terra nullius at the time of
the 1931 decree. One phase of the controversy related to the
"Ihlen Declaration." On July 14, 1919, the Danish Minister
to Norway expressed to the Norwegian Minister for Foreign
Affairs, M. Ihlen, his hope that the extension of Danish control over
all Greenland "would not encounter any difficulty on the part of the
Norwegian Government." M. Thlen replied that the matter would
be considered. On July 22d, M. Ihlen told the Danish Minister that
"the Norwegian Government would not raise any difficulties in the
settlement of this question." Before the Court, Norway contended
that the Ihlen Declaration did not bind Norway, since the Norwe-
gian Constitution required that propositions relating to "matters of
importance" be dealt with by the Council of Ministers."0 Denmark
denied that the Norwegian Foreign Minister had exceeded his
competence.-"
The Court found in favor of Denmark, relying in part on the
Ihlen Declaration, as a result of which it found that "Norway is
under an obligation to refrain from contesting Danish sovereignty
over Greenland as a whole, and a fortiori to refrain from occupying
a part of Greenland." Not passing specifically on the question
whether this was a matter "of special importance" within the mean-
ing of the Norwegian Constitution, the Court said:
The Court considers it beyond all dispute that a reply of this
nature given by a minister for Foreign Affairs on behalf of his
Government in response to a request by the diplomatic repre-
sentative of a foreign Power, in regard to a question falling
within his province, is binding upon the country to which the
Minister belongs. 32
M. Vogt, the Norwegian national judge, did not disagree with this
position but found that M. Ihlen's Declaration was vitiated by mis-
take.3 3 Judge Anzilotti dissented on the question whether Denmark
29. P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53.
30. P.C.I.J., ser. C, No. 62, at 560.
31. Id. at 876-77, 884.
32. P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 53, at 71.
33. Id. at 118:
M. Ihlen, it is true, when making his declarati.n of July 22d, was speak-
ing on behalf of the Norwegian Government and promised that Norway
would raise no difficulty in the future settlement of this matter. Such a
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had established sovereignty over all Greenland, but held the Nor-
wegian occupation decree unlawful because it violated an obligation
validly assumed by Norway in the Ihlen Declaration.34 Both the
majority and dissenting opinions found Norway obligated because
the Declaration had been made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs
and fell within his general province, without deciding whether or
not he was authorized under the Norwegian Constitution to obligate
Norway without formal action by the Council of Ministers. This
approach indicates that the Court would in all probability have found
a treaty internationally binding despite constitutional defects, if
made by the usual organ for the conduct of foreign affairs.
IV. LEAGUE OF NATIONS PRACTICE
Additional light may be found in the practice of the League of
Nations as an international political organization in two cases.
Luxembourg, whose constitution provided for perpetual neutrality,
sought membership in the League in 1919 and 1920, but on the
understanding that the question of her neutrality be reserved. Dis-
cussion in the League subcommittee indicated doubts whether the
League would accept such a condition or understanding. Conse-
quently on November 26, 1920, the Luxembourg delegate wrote to
the subcommittee that Luxembourg would withdraw the condition
or understanding, ask unqualified membership, and seek to have the
requisite change made in the Luxembourg Constitution afterwards.
Luxembourg was admitted to membership on December 16, 1920,
and her executive sought, but could not obtain, the changes in the
Luxembourg Constitution believed necessary to bring it into con-
promise made by the Minister for Foreign Affairs is, in principle, valid
and binding. But in the present case there are special circumstances. M.
Ihlen, when making his declaration, was labouring under a fundamental
and excusable misapprehension.
34. Judge Anzilotti stated, id. at 91-92:
No arbitral or judicial decision relating to the international competence
of a Minister for Foreign Affairs has been brought to the knowledge of
the Court; nor has this question been exhaustively treated by legal author-
ities. In my opinion, it must be recognized that the constant and general
practice of States has been to invest the Minister for Foreign Affairs-
the direct Agent of the Chief of the State-with authority to make state-
ments on current affairs to foreign diplomatic representatives, and in
particular to inform them as to the attitude which the government, in
whose name he speaks, will adopt in a given question. Declarations of this
kind are binding upon the State.
As regards the question whether Norwegian constitutional law
authorized the Minister for Foreign Affairs to make the declaration, that
is a point which, in my opinion, does not concern the Danish Govern-
ment: it was M. Ihlen's duty to refrain from giving his reply until he
had obtained any assent that might be requisite under the Norwegian
laws.
Cf. Anzilotti's attitude, note 12, supra.
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formity with the League Covenant. Thereupon, on April 25 and
June 2, 1921, the Luxembourg representative asked the League
Secretary-General about the temporary status. of Luxembourg pend-
ing constitutional change. As a result, the League Council con-
sidered the matter, and on June 21, 1921, adopted a resolution, in
which the Secretary-General concurred, declaring that Luxembourg
had been admitted categorically and definitively on her own request,
and without the reservation; therefore Luxembourg's rights and
duties were the same as those of other League Members, and from
the League's standpoint there could be no question of special pro-
visional status.3 In this situation, then, Luxembourg was treated
by the League Council and Secretary-General as having assumed
obligations under a treaty, the LeagueCovenant, even though there
may have been a conflict between these treaty obligations and what
was permitted by the Luxembourg Constitution.
Argentina's membership in the League involved a similar ques-
tion, since the Argentine Constitution provided that the President
makes treaties but the Congress has power to approve or reject
them. In 1920, the President of Argentina notified the League of
Argentina's accession to the Covenant, but not until 1933 was any
formal law passed by the Argentine Congress to approve accession.
Meanwhile, Argentina had been treated as a member, though there
appears to have been no formal determination by the League that
Argentina had become a party to the Covenant through the 1920
accession.38
V. DIPLOMATIC CONTROVER:SIES
In so far as evidence of international customary law can be
found in the diplomatic discussions over treaties alleged to be un-
constitutional, the general situation was well summarized as of
1935 in the commentary of the Harvard Research in International
Law, as follows:
35. On this case see de Visscher, op. cit. supra note 6, at 165-72. Ulti-
mately Luxembourg appears to have concluded that the Covenant, as inter-
preted by League practice, did not impose obligations which were in conflict
with her constitution.
36. See Hudson, The Argentine Republic and the League of Nations,
28 Am. J. Int'l L. 125 (1934). Commenting on this situation, Prof. Hudson
(later Judge of the Permanent Court of International Justice), wrote:
If the clear indications of the Eastern Greenland Case are to be followed,
there could be little doubt that the telegram addressed by the President of
the Argentine Republic to the President of the Peace Conference on
January 16, 1920, constituted a binding accession, even though the Argen-
tine Constitution required previous assent by the Congress.(Id. at 132.) He added that even if this position were not acceptable, there




[I] t may be stated that generally States have denied the binding
force of treaties concluded in violation of their own constitutions,
although they have sometimes insisted upon execution of those
which had been ratified by the other parties in violation of their
constitutions.s7
When diplomatic controversies have arisen involving allegedly un-
constitutional treaties, neither party has usually been willing to
admit that the other was correct in law. There would seem little
point in discussing many of these incidents in great detail,38 but it
may be well to refer to some in which the United States has par-
ticipated.
In 1835 the United States Charg6 in Santiago, Mr. Pollard,
believed that a treaty recently signed between Chile and Peru would
jeopardize certain American rights under a treaty between Chile
and the United States. He therefore argued to the Chilean Foreign
Office that the Peruvian ratification was void because it was by a
general who had usurped the Peruvian presidency and without
37. 29 Am. J. Intl L. 1002 (Supp. 1935).
38. Brief accounts of typical incidents will be found in the Harvard Re-
search in International Law, 29 Am. 3. Int'l L. 439, 992 (Supp. 1935) ; Mc-
Nair, op. cit. supra note 6; and J. Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 134-157
(1946). Full accounts are given in de Visscher, De la conclusion des Traits
(1943).
Among the examples often discussed are the Ecuadorean claim of invalidity
of its treaty of August 20, 1860 with Peru; the action of the South African
Republic (Transvaal) in rejecting a boundary arbitration award of October
17, 1871 in favor of a group of native chiefs in Western Griqualand, in which
the agreement to arbitrate had been signed by President Pretorius on behalf
of Transvaal but never approved by the legislature as required by the con-
stitution (in this case the Governor of the British Cape Colony had acted on
behalf of the chiefs, and strongly protested the repudiation of the agreement
by a new President of Transvaal, but for political reasons the British Govern-
ment allowed the award to lapse) ; the Ecuadorean denunciation of the Indus-
trial Property Convention of 1883 to which her executive had acceeded with-
out obtaining the Congressional consent required by her constitution; the
Rumanian repudiation in 1921 of a commercial agreement of 1920 with
Austria which had not been approved by the legislature; the protocol of 1924
for protection of Bulgarian minorities in Greece signed by M. Politis, Greek
delegate to the Council of the League of Nations and then acting President
of the Council, and the League Secretary-General, which was rejected by the
Greek National Assembly; and the boundary dispute of 1935 between Iran
and Iraq before the League Council which involved a treaty of May 31, 1847
between Persia and Turkey, but which was withdrawn by the parties from the
Council's consideration. In none of these instances does there appear to have
been any agreement reached between the parties to the dispute, as to whether
the allegedly unconstitutional treaty was or was not internationally valid if in
fact unconstitutional.
Some writers have also discussed the supposed analogy of concession con-
tracts granted to aliens by governments, which have generally not been held
valid unless granted in conformity with the national law of the grantor state;
since such contracts are far more closely connected with the state's own law, and
on orthodox theory are governed by national law rather than international,
the analogy may be of doubtful pertinence or value.
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the legislative approval required by the Peruvian Constitution."
The Chilean Foreign Minister replied that this was not a question
in which foreign nations were concerned, and that the general
governing Peru had sufficient de facto authority.40 Although Chile
rejected the American Charge's argument, the treaty was soon
repudiated by Peru in the troublesome revolutionary days which
followed. 41
In late 1835 the President of Bolivia, General Santa Cruz,
invaved Peru and took the title of "Protector of the Confederation of
Peru and Bolivia." As such, he caused a commercial treaty to be
signed with the United States, November 30, 1836.42 Though trying
to get approval for the treaty from a conference which he called in
1837, Santa Cruz went ahead and ratified the treaty himself on
January 17, 1837, the ratifications being exchanged May 28, 1838.
Santa Cruz was defeated by regular Peruvian forces, and exiled
in January, 1839. On November 23, 1839, the new Peruvian Con-
gress adopted a law declaring that Peru did not recognize the
treaties concluded with the United States and Great Britain by
Santa Cruz; but this law was not published until 1845. Only in
39. 5 Manning, Diplomatic Correspondence of the United States, Inter-
American Affairs (1831-1860) 44-81 (1937). Though expressing his aware-
ness that "much may be said as to the right of Chile to decide upon the author-
ity of those with whom she may make contracts," Mr. Pollard said that in this
case the rights of a third party, the United States, were involved. Stating that
General Salaverry, who had ratified on behalf of Peru, had not been recog-
nized and could not be considered the de facto head of the Peruvian executive,
he said:
[T]he Ratification of the treaty on the part of Peru, by General Sala-
verry, is null and void, being without authority: against the constitution
of the Country. By the constitution of Peru the Legislative body is to have
the action on treaties. General Salaverry has not revoked the constitution
by decree or proclamation therefore it is in full force and virtue, even as
concerns his acts. If General Salaverry was rightfully the Executive of
Peru he could not ratify the treaty, because the constitution secures that
power to the Legislative body. But all the power that General Salaverry
has is the power of force and not legitimate. The treaty therefore is an
invalid instrument. Both parties to a contract must have the power of
contracting otherwise the contract is void and can have no legal opera-
tion. Id. at 80-81.
40. The Chilean Foreign Minister stated:
Whether General Salaverry is or is not a legitimate chief magistrate is
not a question in which foreign nations have a right to intervene. At the
time when the treaty was presented to him for his ratification, and in which
such ratification was authorized by that Chief, nearly all Peru was sub-
ject to his authority.... If, in order to treat with a foreign government,
its titles had to be examined and proved in the crucible of written con-
stitutions, how many of the treaties which are to-day in force would there
be? De facto possession is all that foreign nations verify in order to con-
clude commercial conventions among themselves. Id. at 85.
41. Id. at 97.
42. 4 Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States
71 (1931). On this incident, see also de Visscber, op. cit. supra note 6, at 201.
1958]
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1847 was it brought to the attention of the United States by a note
from the Peruvian Minister in Washington, which said that the
so-called Peru-Bolivian Confederation was nothing more than a
"project" and never attained the character of a body which could
make treaties; even if it had existed as such a body, General Santa
Cruz, under the project of federal compact of 1837, could not enter
into treaties without the consent of the Senate, which was never
appointed and never assembled. However, Peru had no objection to
the substance of the treaty and was willing to conclude a new one
along the same lines. 3 Secretary of State Buchanan replied that a
long period had elapsed without Peruvian objection, Peru's con-
duct having conformed to the treaty provisions, and that General
Santa Cruz had actual power when the ratifications were exchanged.
He added:
It is not the intention of the Undersigned at present to reply to
the argument. If this were his purpose, he might contend with
great force that the long acquiescence of the Peruvian Govern-
ment in the terms of this Convention, without any notice or
intimation to the contrary, precluded it at this late date from
objecting to the authority by which the Convention was con-
cluded.
Preferring to avoid discussion of the legal issue, he was willing to
conclude a new convention with Peru and "leave the validity of the
present convention undecided. ' 44
Venezuela signed a protocol with the United States August 21,
1909, agreeing to pay the United States in settlement of a claim of
an American company for violation of a 1900 Venezuelan conces-
sion. On August 4 a new Government Council had come into exist-
ence in Venezuela under a new constitution, and some urged the
Venezuelan executive to refer the protocol to this new Council for
43. 4 Miller, Treaties and Other International Acts of the United States
103; also in 10 Manning, op. cit. supra note 39, at 553.
44. 4 Miller, op. cit. supra note 43, at 105; 10 Manning, op. cit. supra
note 39, at 239-41. Concurrently with signature of a new treaty, Secretary
Buchanan and the Peruvian Minister signed a declaration on February 9,
1848, that any rights under the old treaty which any American citizen may
have acquired should be decided "as if the said treaty were in force with
the approbation of both Governments." 4 Miller, op. cit. supra at 106.
A similar question arose in 1843 as to a Claims Convention of March 17,
1841 between the United States and Peru, which was first ratified by Peru
without approval of Congress as required by the Peruvian Constitution and
specified in the treaty. Though the United States Charg6 remonstrated that
this ratification was internationally valid, the United States did not object to
a subsequent Congressional approval, new Peruvian ratification, and second
exchange of ratifications in 1846. In view of the treaty stipulation for approval
by the Peruvian Congress this seems the natural result. See id. at 329; de
Visscher, op. cit. supra note 6, at 204-05.
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its approval. The American Minister reported to Washington that
the Venezuelan Government had insisted that, as the negotiations
had been completed prior to installation of the new Government
Council, there was no need to submit the protocol to it. The Ameri-
can Minister suggested, however, that the protocol be submitted to
the Council in order to avoid question. As to this suggestion, the
Department of State responded:
Protocol is a fait accompli, internationally speaking. In signing
the protocol as a finality and not ad referendum, the Venezuelan
Foreign Office gave assurances that it either had or would
obtain power to make its action good. Upn these assurances this
Government is, internationally speaking, entitled to rely, and
behind them it is not entitled to go. With the steps, if any, which
the Venezuelan Government should take to regularize its action
according to Venezuelan municipal law, this Department has no
concern and can tender no advice.45
In 1931 President Moncada of Nicaragua suggested that the
1914 Nicaraguan Canal Treaty with the United States violated a
provision in the Nicaraguan Constitution forbidding treaties "which
are opposed to the independence and integrity of the nation or which
affect in any way its sovereignty, excepting those which tend to
union with one or more of the republics of Central America." He
urged this as a reason why Nicaragua should adopt a new constitu-
tion. Secretary of State Stimson replied:
To discuss at this time the question of the constitutionality of the
Canal Treaty of August 5, 1914, seems to me of doubtful utility.
It is self-evident that the provisions of this treaty were not re-
garded by the Nicaraguan Government which negotiated it as
being in conflict with the Constitution .... I am confident that
when and if the United States Government decides to exercise
the option granted it under the Treaty, the Government of
Nicaragua will not fail to take whatever action may be considered
necessary on its part to insure the proper realization of the objec-
tives of the treaty.40
The above were instances in which the United States has dis-
cussed the possible effect of violation of some other nation's con-
stitution. With the exception of Charg6 Pollard's protest in 1835
concerning the Chilean-Peruvian treaty, which does not appear to
have been under instructions from the Department of State, the
45. 5 Haclkvorth, Digest of International Law 157 (1943).
46. 5 Hackworth, Digest of International Law 155 (1943). It may be
noted that in 1914 the Department of State had received a paraphrase of a
cable from the Nicaraguan Minister for Foreign Relations to the Nicaraguan
Minister in Washington, which stated that the argument of unconstitutionality
of this treaty was absurd. Ibid.
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United States took the position that the treaty was internationally
effective.47 In the Dillon case 48 a French consul objected to being
subpoenaed as a witness for a defendant in a United States federal
court, claiming that he was given an immunity from legal process to
compel his appearance as a witness by the consular convention be-
tween the United States and France. However, the counsel for the
consul, the judge, and Secretary of State Marcy were all in agree-
ment that in an American court the Constitution would prevail over
the treaty if in fact the immunity given was in conflict with the
sixth amendment to the Constitution. However Judge Hoffman
ruled that the sixth amendment was intended only to place the ac-
cused in the same position in making his defense as the government
occupied in trying to prove his guilt, and thus the object of the
amendment was obtained despite the exemption granted the consul
by treaty. Therefore the consul was ruled exempt. However, the
French Government was dissatisfied because the consul had been
brought into court against his will, and after a long disagreement the
United States and France arranged in May, 1855, that by way of
amends the United States would salute a French national ship or
squadron when one next came to San Francisco. In the interpreta-
tion by Judge Hoffman of the sixth amendment, and the willingness
of the United States to give the salute, some have seen an indication
that the United States would consider the treaty to be interna-
tionally valid despite conflict with the Constitution. 9
While the Dillon incident is inconclusive on this point, a clear
and important statement that the United States might be inter-
nationally liable under a treaty found to be unconstitutional occurred
in connection with the St. Lawrence Waterway proposals. After a
treaty between the United States and Canada for construction of
the Waterway failed to obtain a favorable vote in the Senate. much
the same provisions were embodied in an agreement submitted to
Congress for approval by majority vote of both Houses. Some
Senators doubted whether such a "Congressional agreement" could
constitutionally be used instead of a treaty. In hearings before a sub-
committee of the Senate Commerce Committee, November 29, 1944,
G. H. Hackworth, then Legal Adviser of the Department of State
and now President of the International Court of Justice, said:
47. Unless, of course, the treaty itself stipulates that there must be
compliance with constitutional requirements, as in the Peruvian claims con-
vention of 1841, note 44 supra. Cf. note 18 supra.
48. 5 Moore, Digest of International Law 78-81, 167-68 (1906); In re
Dillon, 7 Sawyer 561, 7 Fed. Cas. 710, No...) (C.C.N.D. Cal. 1854).
49. Cf. Wright, Michigan Summer Institute, supra note 6, at 197.
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In international law the head of the government is entitled to
speak for the state, and if the President enters into an obligation
with a foreign government, that foreign government is entitled
to rely upon it. It is not under the obligation of inquiring into
our constitutional processes. It takes the word of the head of
the State.
If the obligation is violated, it is a violation of an international
obligation pure and simple, whether the President exceeded his
authority or not. He is supposed to act within his authority, but
if he gets outside of that, the other government is entitled to rely
upon his action....
I am inclined to think that if you went before an arbitration
tribunal, the tribunal would say that the foreign government had
the right to rely upon the word of the Chief Executive, and
whether he has or has not exceeded his autority is a domestic
issue here. But the other foreign government is entitled to rely
upon what he agrees to do."
As this statement was made almost a decade after the Harvard Re-
search in International Law had come to the contrary conclusion,
it may be considered a strong factor in support of the view that inter-
national agreements may be internationally binding even though
they have been entered into in a way which is held to be contrary
to the constitution of a party."
VI. INTERNATIONAL LAw PREVAILS OVER CONFLICTING
NATIONAL LAW
Closely connected with the view that constitutional limitations
do not invalidate the international effect of a treaty, is the rule stated
by the Permanent Court of International Justice in its advisory
opinion on Treatment of Polish Nationals in Danzing :2 " [A] State
50. Hearings Before the Subcommittee of the Senate Committee on
Commerce, 78th Cong., 2d Sess. at 230 (Nov. 29, 1944).
51. That there seems to be a trend in the direction of recognizing the
international validity of treaties which do not conform to national constitu-
tions, note the change in Prof. Hyde's views (notes 7 and 8 supra) ; Murphy's
suggestions in note 14 supra; and Prof. Rice's suggestion that with the consti-
tutions of a number of nations such as France, Germany, and The Netherlands
giving treaties priority over national laws even in national courts, an inter-
national organ is encouraged to give priority to international law in these
matters both as to such states and as to those whose courts do not give treaties
priority internally. Michigan Summer Institute, supra note 6, at 208-09. Prof.
Rice also alluded to the concurring opinions of Justices Reed and Jackson in
the United States Supreme Court with respect to conflicts between inter-
state compacts and state constitutional provisions, West Virginia ex reL. Dyer
v. Sims, 341 U.S. 22, 32, 35, 36 (1951).
52. P.C.I.J., ser. A/B, No. 44, at 24 (1932). To the same effect, see state-
ment of Sir Herbert Sisnett, Arbitrator, in the Shufeldt claim (United States
v. Guatemala, 1930), Dep't of State Arbitration, ser. 3, 851, 876-77; Letter
from Secretary of State Bayard to the Minister to Mexico, [1887] Foreign
Rel. U.S. 751, 753; and Declaration of Rights and Duties of States (adopted
June 9, 1949 by the International Law Commission of the United Nations),
44 Am. J. Int'l L. 13 (Supp. 1950).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
cannot adduce as against another State its own Constitution with a
view to evading obligations incumbent upon it under international
law or treaties in force." It is well recognized that a State's obliga-
tions under a treaty are not altered or diminished by the fact that the
appropriate legislative body has failed to appropriate funds or to
take any other necessary legislative action to implement the treaty,
or terminates its internal effect as national law.53
By analogy, some argue that constitutional provisions are equally
ineffective in avoiding the obligation of a treaty which has been
accepted by the Executive, as the normal organ of the State for the
conduct of foreign affairs. This argument may be particularly appro-
priate when it is a question of constitutional restrictions on the types
of treaty which may be made, rather than as to what organs may
bind the state by their acts. Instances often relied on in these dis-
cussions include the controversy between the United States and
France over French failure to pay money promised in their treaty
of July 4, 1831, 54 and the Swiss-French arbitration of 1912. In
53. In the United States, and most other countries, appropriations re-
quired for performance of treaty obligations must be approved by legislation.
Though in the United States, and a considerable number of other countries,
many treaties are "self-executing" in national courts without the need for
further legislation, in some countries all treaties require legislation to make
them effective as domestic law. The same is true in the United States as to
"non-self-executing" treaties. Failure to implement a treaty which is not "self-
executing" would entail international responsibility for non-performance of
the treaty, even where this failure is due to the constitutional incapacity of the
national legislature to do so, as when it was held that the Canadian federal
government lacked constitutional power to implement international labor
conventions. Attorney-General for Canada v. Attorney-General for Ontario,
[1937] A.C. 326 P.C. In this case the Privy Council recognized with respect
to treaties that "once they are created, while they bind the State as against
the other contracting parties, Parliament may refuse to perform them and so
leave the State in default." Id. at 348.
In the United States, when a treaty and an Act of Congress are wholly in-
consistent with each other and cannot be reconciled, the courts hold the later
in time as prevailing over the earlier. Under these circumstances, Secretary of
State Hughes well pointed out in a letter of February 19, 1923, to Secretary of
the Treasury Mellon:[A] judicial determination that an act of Congress is to prevail over a
treaty does not relieve the Government of the United States of the obliga-
tions established by a treaty. When this obligation is not performed a
claim will inevitably be made to which the existence of merely domestic
legislation does not constitute a defense and, if the claim seems to be well
founded and other methods of settlement have not been availed of, the
usual recourse is an arbitration in which international rules of action and
obligations would be the subject of consideration. 5 Hackworth, Digest
of International Law 194-95 (1943).
54. By this treaty of 1831 France promised to pay a certain sum in com-
pensation for damages suffered by Americans at the hands of the French
Government. Though under the French Constitution of that time the king
could make treaties, only Parliament could impose taxes and appropriate
money. When the French executive could not get from Parliament approval
of the necessarily legislation to carry out the treaty, the United States insisted
on performance, taking the attitude that the treaty, having been constitution-
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neither of these cases, indeed, did the non-performing party con-
tend that the treaty was unconstitutional or internationally invalid,
and the settlement in the former and arbitral award in the latter are
not directly relevant as international precedents in favor of the
validity of unconstitutional treaties. At most they may serve as sup-
porting analogies.
In the Swiss-French case55 the question was whether France was
entitled in 1910 to modify her tariff on certain steam turbines im-
ported from Switzerland, in view of an agreement (called commer-
cial convention and regulations) signed by the parties in 1906.
Switzerland claimed that this agreement stabilized the existing tariff
on such imports, while France argued that for many years her policy
had been based on retaining her own control over her tariff and that
her tariff could be modified only by legislation. The resulting dis-
pute was submitted to arbitration, and in an award by Lord Reay
(Great Britain) as umpire, in favor of Switzerland, he said:
Considering that the treaty of commerce and the regulations
are international conventions governed by the sanction which the
contracting parties, represented by their plenipotentiaries, have
given thereto; ....
The tribunal is not called upon to consider whether or not
the regulations must be submitted to the sanction of the legisla-
ture; that is a matter pertaining to internal law.
The award interpreted the agreement in favor of Switzerland, and
in its application clearly treated the agreement as valid.6
VII. CODIFICATION ATTEMPTS
The only multilateral treaty dealing with the question appears
to be the Pan-American Convention on Treaties,5 7 signed in 1928 as
part of the Pan-American efforts toward codification of international
ally concluded and ratified, was obligatory on every department of the con-
tracting government. France does not appear to have asserted that the treaty
was unconstitutional. After a bitter controversy, France commenced to pay
in 1836. See 5 Moore, Digest of International Arbitrations to Which the
United States Has Been a Party 4447, 4463-68 (1898) ; see also 7 Moore,
Digest of International Law 123-30 (1906).
55. 6 Am. J. Int'l L. 995 (1912).
56. One should note the comment in McNair, Constitutional Limitations
upon the Treaty-Making Power, in Arnold, 1 Treaty-Making Procedure 8
(1933).
It will be noted that France does not appear to have contended specifically
that the Convention was not binding upon her by reason of the non-
compliance with a constitutional limitation. The argument was rather
that the French Government could not have agreed to what Switzer-
land claimed they were bound to do, because that could only be done by
legislative action, which, it is to be inferred, was outside their control.
57. 4 Hudson, International Legislation 2378 (1931).
MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
law and ratified by six states,58 as of 1939, but not yet in force
because of insufficient ratifications. Article 1 of this convention
reads: "Treaties will be concluded by the competent authorities of
the States or by their representatives, according to their respective
internal law." The usual analysis of this convention is that given
by Professor Hudson: "This would seem to require compliance with
a state's constitutional requirements before a valid treaty [or
engagement] can be concluded. ' "
In its work toward codification of the law of treaties, the United
Nations International Law Commission has also struggled with this
problem; but the Commission has not yet agreed upon a draft
on the law of treaties nor definitively settled its own attitude on this
particular question. Professor J. L. Brierly, in his first and third
reports on the law of treaties, 60 submitted to the Commission April
14, 1950 and April 10, 1952, favored giving international effect to
constitutional restrictions in the treaty field. At its Third Session
(1951), the Commission provisionally adopted an article to the
effect that the competence of a State to make treaties is exercised
by the organs which its constitution designates to that effect,"1 and
then provisionally altered this to a statement that, in the absence
of a contrary disposition in its constitutional law and practice, the
capacity of a State to make treaties is presumed to lie in its chief of
state.
62
Thereafter Professor Lauterpacht became the special rapporteur
on treaties, and in his report of March 24, 1953 8 discussed the prob-
lem at length. He agreed that constitutional restrictions had some
international effect, and said that the article provisionally adopted
would be acceptable to a certain extent, if in all countries constitu-
tional limitations on the treaty power were clearly defined, well-
known, and easy to verify. But he believed that just the contrary was
the case with respect to these limitations. He urged that it was
important to prevent any rule adopted in codification being used
as an excuse to escape treaty obligations, and therefore emphasized
that provision must be made for international judicial determination
of claims that treaties were invalid for unconstitutionality. In this
58. Brazil, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Haiti, Nicaragua and Pana-
man, according to 3. Jones, Full Powers and Ratification 149 (1946).
59. Hudson, The Argentine Republic and the League of Nations, 28
Am. J. Int'l L. 125, 132 (1934).
60. U.N. Doc. Nos. A/CN.4/23 (1950) and A/CN.4/54 (1952), respec-
tively.
61. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L 17 (1951).
62. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/L. 28 (1951).
63. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/63 (1953).
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report, and in a later one,"4 Lauterpacht proposed a text to the
effect that a treaty concluded without regard for the limitations
imposed by a party's constitutional law and practices may be an-
nulled at the request of that party, though not on the request of
some other State. Any party seeking to nullify on this ground
would be obligated, in case of dispute, to bring the case before
the International Court of Justice. Furthermore, any contracting
party would be considered as having renounced this right of an-
nulment if it had during a long period refrained from alleging
nullity, or if it had put into effect the provisions of the treaty or had
derived a benefit from it. In any event, the party escaping the treaty
obligations on this ground of nullity would be responsible for all
prejudices caused the other party in so far as the latter could not
reasonably be considered aware of the constitutional limitation in
question.
When Lauterpacht went on the International Court of Justice,
he was in turn succeeded as special rapporreur on treaties for the
International Law Commission by Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice, Legal
Adviser of the British Foreign Office. Fitzmaurice took a some-
what different position in his first report on the law of treaties, of
March 16, 1956,5 proposing as a part of a code on the law of treaties
an Article 9, reading:
(1) Treaty-making and all other acts connected with treaties
are, on the international plane, executive acts, and the function
of the executive authority. Whatever legislative processes have
to be gone through in order to make such acts effective on the
domestic plane, on the international plane they are authentic.
(2) On the international plane, therefore, the treaty-making
power is exercised:
(a) In the case of a State, by the competent executive
authority (Head of State, government) : it is for each State to
determine for itself what constitutional processes are necessary
in order to place the executive authority in a position, on the
domestic plane, to exercise this power; but, on the international
plane, its exercise is the act of the executive authority.6
(3) No State is obliged, or, strictly speaking, entitled, to
accept as internationally the acts of another State in relation to a
treaty, unless they are acts of the executive authority; but be-
cause a State is bound to accept them if they are of this character,
they necessarily bind the State whence they emanate, which,
64. U.N. Doc. No. A/CN.4/87 (1954).
65. U.N. No. A/CN.4/101 (1956), reprinted in 2 Yearbook of the Int'l
Law Comm'n 104 (1956).
66. The omitted paragraph 2(b) deals with treaties made by interna-
tional organizations, such as the United Nations.
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having performed them through its executive authority, may not
then deny their international authenticity.
Commenting in his report upon this draft, Sir Gerald declares that a
State may not subsequently deny the international authenticity of
the acts of its executive authority, thus reiterating his earlier posi-
tion6 and departing from the views expressed by the previous spe-
cial rapporteurs on treaties.
What will prove to be the final attitude of the International Law
Commission on this point remains uncertain, as does the possible
effects of any drafts which the Commission may report to the Gen-
eral Assembly. In the discussions there has been sharp difference of
opinion among the Commission members. In comparing the ap-
proaches of the successive special rapporteurs on treaties, it may be
of interest to note that Sir Gerald, like Judge Hackworth,68 spoke
on this problem with a long background of service as the legal
adviser of a foreign office, and was thoroughly familiar at first hand
with the practical difficulties of ascertaining just what another
State's constitution may be interpreted to mean, and aware of the
need to be able to rely on the competence to bind the State of the
organs through which international relations are normally carried
on and agreements entered into.
VIII. CONCLUSIONS
After seeing what the problem is, the differing solutions sug-
gested, and the rather sparse yet conflicting evidence as to any rule
of customary internatioiial law on the point, what may we conclude?
Honest appraisal confirms Lauterpacht's statement that "there is a
wide and unresolved divergence of views and practice as to the
effect of the disregard of constitutional limitations" with respect to
treaties, and compels agreement that the subject indeed falls under
the rubric of "absence of agreed law."6 9 But we can perhaps go a
little further and reach some tentative conclusions.
In the first place, we must bear in mind that States will be
reluctant to admit, in abstract discussion or codification attempts,
that they can be bound by agreements made in violation of their oun
constitutions, though often ready enough to insist that other States
may be obligated by agreements not conforming to such other States'
67. See note 11 supra.
68. See text at note 50 supra.
69. Lauterpacht, Codification and4 Development of International Lazw, 49
Am. J. Int'l L. 16, 18 (1955).
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constitutions! This is only a natural reaction, but it must be
i eckoned with when we try to determine what is the present rule of
international law. There is little need to reiterate the importance of
respect for and observance of constitutional provisions if nations are
to maintain democratic governments. Those familiar with the con-
duct of foreign affairs will be quick to see the counter-balancing
needed to be able to rely on the pledged word of a foreign govern-
ment given through its normal organs for conduct of foreign rela-
tions, if we are to have any hope of international stability and if
treaties are to accomplish the purposes for which they are made. The
most desirable rule would appear to be one intermediate between
the two extremes of saying either that any conflict with the constitu-
tion makes a treaty internationally void, or that violations of the
constitution never affect the international validity of international
agreements.
Examining the evidence as to customary law, it appears too
strongly opposed to the theory that an unconstitutional treaty is
necessarily void internationally, for that theory to be acceptable.
Such a theory appears untenable when, to the powerful practical and
theoretical arguments in opposition, we must add the weight of
the Rio Martin arbitration, the analogy o' the Free Zones and
Eastern Greenland cases before the Permanent Court of Interna-
tional Justice, the League of Nations practice concerning Luxem-
bourg and Argentina, the Hackworth statement in the St. Lawrence
Waterway hearings, and the well-settled rule that in the "interna-
tional forum" conflict with national law or constitution is no excuse
for non-performance of international obligation.7 0
If we approach the problem de lege ferenda and seek what we
think would be a good rule, there is much to be said for the distinc-
tion between constitutional limitations readily known by a foreign
negotiator, or which relate directly to treaty-making, from the
relatively obscure or "remote" types of limitations. We might favor
70. It may well be, as was asserted in the passage quoted in note 7 supra,
that the "instances of international usage, accepted as law, are too fragmentary
and inconclusive to be of much value" in establishing clearly the contrary ex-
treme rule that violation of constitutional restrictions never invalidates
treaties internationally. But the evidence in support of the rule that uncon-
stitutional treaties are void internationally-found chiefly in the combination
of the Cleveland award in the Nicaraguan-Costa Rican dispute, the Pan-
American Convention on Treaties (largely unratified), national assertions in
unsettled diplomatic controversies which were countered by national assertions
of the contrary rule by the opjosite side, and the probable preponderance of
opinions of writers (if one makes an arithmetical count of those who have
supported various views)-would not appear to suffice to overcome the
evidence that unconstitutional treaties may at least sometimes be valid in
international law.
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stress on good faith reliance on the statements or implied7' assur-
ances of competence given by the normal organs of foreign affairs.
Such suggested rules would probably guide us well in many of the
cases that can be imagined, and may help us select the situations
where most students would say that at least under the circumstances
of such a case constitutional difficulties should not invalidate
treaties. However, the great difficulty with saying that any of them
is the actual rule of international law lies in the fact that the evidence
we have as to customary international law does not support the dis-
tinctions which these rules would draw between the cases where
unconstitutional treaties are void, and those where they are in-
ternationally effective.
For example, it has been suggested that written constitutional
provisions always invalidate treaties in conflict with them, probably
because it is assumed to be easy for a foreign treaty-maker to become
aware of written constitutions. Nevertheless, it may be seen that in
at least72 the Free Zones case, the Eastern Greenland case, and the
League practice concerning Luxembourg and Argentina, written
constitutions were involved but the written nature of the constitution
was not held to make the international agreement void. If the test
were reasonable possibility of finding out about the constitutional
provision, or conversely the unreasonableness of relying exclusively
on the treaty-makers' express or implied assurances concerning com-
petence, we would find that such a rule breaks down in at least7 3 the
Free Zones case, Eastern Greenland case, and the League action
concerning Luxembourg and Argentina, in each of which there
was apparently as much opportunity as could be expected in any
ordinary situation for the foreign negotiator to find out independent-
ly about the constitution involved; and yet the international validity
of the agreement was upheld. When tested against the record of
cases and controversies, it is hard, indeed, to remain convinced that
these several suggested rules do in fact represent the existing law.
71. Cf. Prof. Rice's statement, Michigan Summer Institute, supra note
6, at 206: "a country, by dealing, warrants that it has authority to deal, and
for any person or court outside of the nation to question what its agent or
organ of communication represents to be its power is to intrude into internal
affairs."
72. The United States, of course, also has a written constitution, but
the unwritten character of the rules concerning "Congressional agreements"
may prevent our classifying it as such when studying the St. Lawrence Water-
way question.
73. Probably, indeed, the British Diplomatic Agent in Morocco who
exchanged notes with the Maghzen of Morocco was familiar with the distribu-
tion of governmental power in that country, and one would expect that
Canada's treaty-makers were not wholly uninformed about the controversy




These rules suggested by the writers or codifiers seem more like
propositions upon which it is hoped that a maximum of agreement
might be obtained, than like statements of existing customary law
supported by the statements of foreign offices or international
judges, or rules distinguishing between the cases in which unconsti-
tutional agreements have been held void and those in which they
have been internationally effective. Nevertheless, and perhaps for
that very reason, they may help us predict the rules upon which in-
ternational judges would be likely to operate, since these suggested
solutions and the reasoning back of them would appeal to such
judges as much as to anyone else. In this way, they may guide us in
trying to find "the law" when "law" is defined as the prediction of
what judges or officials will be most likely to do about disputes with
which they have to deal.
Thus, it is probably true that the more "notorious" and clear-cut
the constitutional provision, the quicker we would be to feel that its
violation ought to result in a void treaty. Conversely, the greater
the degree of reasonable reliance on assurances of constitutional
competence, especially if they are express, the more just it seems
to uphold the treaty.7' Attempting to predict the reaction of inter-
national tribunals, most would probably believe that an international
court confronted with the hypothetical ratification of the Treaty of
Versailles by the President without Senate advice and consent,
would say that the United States should not be bound. On the other
hand, when it is a choice between Senate approval as a "treaty"
in the narrow constitutional sense of the word, and approval by
both Houses of Congress acting by majority vote as a "Congres-
sional agreement," there is enough current opinion (right or wrong)
holding that whatever can be done by the former method can
likewise be done by the latter, to make it very difficult for an inter-
national court to say that a foreign nation is unreasonably wrong
in relying on the decision of our President and Cogress that a "Con-
gressional agreement" is proper-even though it is also quite con-
ceivable that the Supreme Court might later hold that such a "Con-
gressional agreement" could not be the proper constitutional means
74. When we think of a constitutional provision the violation of which
would render a treaty invalid, we tend to imagine an experienced foreign
negotiator looking at one of the obvious provisions of the United States Con-
stitution. When we think of the reasonableness of relying on the foreign
government's assurances, the picture which comes to mind is often that of the
difficulty which we or a South American negotiator might have in making
independent verification of the extent of power of the treaty-making organs of
Yemen or Outer Mongolia.
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of making the particular agreement.7 5 It might be equally probable
that an international court would uphold a treaty made by the
Swedish King without concurrence of the Riksdag, though it should
afterwards have been held in Sweden that the agreement related
to a "matter of importance." The same would seem likely with a
Costa Rican treaty which did not appear to "conflict with the
sovereignty or independence of the Republic," but which Costa
Rican authorities later held to be in such conflict. In the case of
Mexico it might be hard to get an international court to uphold as
internationally effective a Mexican extradition treaty which "on the
face of it" stipulated the extradition of those whom the treaty called
"political criminals." On the other hand, if the treaty provided for
the surrender of a class of anarchists or political assassins whom
the treaty-makers did not consider "political criminals" but whom
the Mexican courts later held to come within the protection of the
constitutional provision, an international court would be likely to
hold Mexico obligated.
Many would agree that the United States might be obligated
internationally, at least to the extent of an obligation to pay damages
for non-performance,7 6 if we entered into a treaty which was later
held unconstitutional for violation of such a guarantee in the Bill of
Rights as the defendant's right to jury trial or to compulsory process
to obtain witnesses. The probability of such an international de-
cision would be enhanced if the question of constitutional interpreta-
tion were generally regarded as a doubtful one at the time the treaty
was concluded and ratified.
All in all, we must recognize that international law is far from
certain and settled in this field. We must admit the possibility that
states may be found to be obligated internationally by treaties which
are in conflict with their constitutions, though we may not be able
75. Although there would seem little or no question that such an agree-
ment as that involved in the St. Lawrence Waterway situation could con-
stitutionally be made either by the President-and-Senate method, or by the
President with both Houses of Congress as a "Congressional agreement," it is
quite possible that an agreement dealing with matters falling within the
reserved powers of our States so far as Congressional action is concerned,
could not be dealt with by "Congressional agreement" though it might prop-
erly be handled by the treaty-making power of the President and the Senate.
76. Generally speaking, damages for non-performance seem as far as
international law remedies go; we have little as yet in the way of international
tribunals or agencies compelling specific performance of treaty obligations.
Note also that though the Harvard Research in International Law suggested
that the treaty would be void but damages would be awarded for misleading
assurances, neither the statements nor practices of governments and interna-
tional tribunals in this field of unconstitutional treaties bear out this sugges-
tion. If there is liability internationally, it is regarded as liability because of




to conclude safely that in all circumstances constitutional limitations
lack international effect. Much may depend upon the role in which
we envisage the lawyer giving an answer to this question, whether
as an advocate for one side or the other in a controversy, or as an
adviser to government or (say) private investor about to act in
reliance on a treaty whose constitutionality may be questionedY.7 So
long as there may be a possibility of the result turning on the degree
of reliance on assurances, there may be a very practical problem for
the legal adviser, public or private, as to whether he should pursue
independent investigations into the other country's constitutional
law, which might later be held to disprove his reliance! At present
we must rely more on common sense and "desirable policy" than
upon "general practice accepted as law" in efforts to ascertain and
estimate whether or not in a particular case a State will be regarded
as obligated by an unconstitutional treaty. Of course, it is always
easy to point out that the problem will not arise if those who make
treaties do in fact succeed in keeping within the constitution in-
volved.
So far as the future of the law is concerned, it will help greatly
in the progressive development of this field of international law if
we can learn far more than is now generally known about the
actual practice and attitudes of most States of the world regarding
this problem. Our evidence of practice may be far from complete,
and our information as to the attitudes of foreign offices is very
scanty. Despite the great difficulty of getting foreign offices to com-
mit themselves on such a problem as this, the question would seem
to be one on which there would be great value in obtaining honest
and careful answers from as many governments as possible to a
well-designed questionnaire from the United Nations International
Law Commission, covering both their past practice and their present
beliefs. When we know more of what the nations of the world have
done in this matter, and more of what they think is the proper solu-
tion, we will be in a better position to predict what an international
tribunal seized of the question would actually decide, and thus to
say what the international law rule on it is.
77. Cf. Murphy, Michigan Summer Institute, r'upra note 6, at 203.

